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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - EVIDENCE - OPINION 
OF NON-TREATING PSYCHIATRIST BASED ON CLAIM-
ANT'S STATEMENTS HELD INADMISSIBLE. CANDELLA V. 
SUBSEQUENT INJURY FUND, 277 Md. 120, 353 A.2d 263 
(1976). 
When the Maryland General Assembly first enacted the Work-
men's Compensation Article,1 it directed, in what is now Section 11,2 
that 
the Commission shall not be bound by the usual common 
law or statutory rules of evidence ..• but may make the 
investigation in such a manner as in its judgment is best 
calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties 
and to carry out justly the spirit of this act.8 
However, at the same time that the legislature granted this greater 
latitude to the Commission with respect to the admission of evi-
dence, it also provided for a review of Commission decisions by 
1. The original Workmen's Compensation Act appears in Law of April 16, 1914, 
ch. 800, §§ 1-&5, [1914] Laws of Md. 1429. The current version of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act is codified in MD. ANN. ConE art. 101, §§ 1-102 (1964) as 
amended, (Supp. 1976). 
2. Mn. ANN. CoDE art. 101, § 11 (1964). The present language in Section 11 
formerly appeared in Section 10 of the original Act. See note 3 infra. 
3. Law of April 16, 1914, ch. 800, § 10, [1914] Laws of Md. 1429 (current version 
at Mn. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 11 (1964) ). 
In a further effort to effectuate the benevolent purpose of the Workmen's 
Compensation Article, the legislature directed that "[t]he rule that statutes in 
derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed shall have no appli-
cation to this article ...• " MD. ANN. ConE art. 101, § 63 (1964). The Maryland 
Court of Appeals has on several occasions stated that the article is social legis-
lation and its provisions are to be liberally construed. However, the rule of 
liberal construction has not been applied specifically to the issue of admission 
of evidence. Instead, it has been applied in various situations as a general rule 
of construction for the Workmen's Compensation Article. See Tavel v. Bechtel 
Corp., 242 Md. 299, 219 A.2d 43 (1966) (rule applied in determination that in-
jury while driving to work was not within the course of employment); Mureddu 
v. Gentile, 233 Md. 216, 196 A.2d 82 (1964) (loss of use of leg due to knee in-
jury could constitute permanent total disability despite specific statutory com-
pensation for loss of leg) ; Bayshore Indus., Inc. v. Ziats, 232 Md. 167, 192 A.2d 
487 (1963) (worker's claim, initiated after deadline for filing, allowed where 
delay was induced by threats and promises by agents of employer) ; Watson v. 
Grimm, 200 Md. 461, 90 A.2d 180 (1952) (rule applied in determination that 
injury while being transported from work by employer was within the course 
of employment) ; Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard v. Rosenthal, 185 Md. 416, 45 
A.2d 79 (1945) (rule applied in determining whether or not wife who had been 
separated from her husband was totally dependent on him for support). 
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the circuit courts4 in a proceeding which is essentially a trial de 
novo.11 If the circuit courts,6 in reviewing Commission decisions, 
are required to adhere strictly to the common law rules of evidence, 
then the evidentiary freedom allowed to the Commission by statute 
would be substantially undermined. Specifically, a party who relies 
on hearsay testimony to obtain an award from the Commission 
confronts the possibility that the very evidence used to support 
that award can later be held inadmissible by the circuit court in a 
trial de novo. This possibility became harsh reality for the claimant 
in Candella v. Subsequent Injury Fund.1 
Florence D. Candella was working as a hotel maid, when she 
received a severe electrical shock8 while attempting to turn off a 
vacuum cleaner. She sustained no physical injury but claimed that 
the shock caused emotional problems for which she sought com-
pensation. The only expert medical testimony to support her claim 
before the Commission was given by a psychiatrist, Dr. Teitelbaum. 
Mrs. Candella had seen the psychiatrist on four occasions for the 
purpose of qualifying him as an expert rather than for the purpose 
of treatment. Dr. Teitelbaum's testimony, based solely on the 
medical history given by Mrs. Candella, was that she suffered from 
4. Law of April 16, 1914, ch. 800, § SS, [1914] Laws of Md. 1429 (current version 
at Mn. ANN. CODE art. 101, § S6(a) (Supp. 1976) ), originally provided that: 
Any employer, employe, [sic] beneficiary or person feeling aggrieved by 
any decision of the Commission affecting his interest under the Act may 
have the same reviewed by a proceeding in the nature of an appeal and 
initiated in the Circuit Court of the County or in the Common Law Courts 
of Baltimore City having jurisdiction over the place where the accident 
occurred or over the person appealing from such decision, and the Court 
shall determine whether the Commission has justly considered all the facts 
concerning injury, whether it has exceeded the powers granted it by the 
Act, whether it has misconstrued the law and the facts applicable in the case 
decided .••• Upon the hearing of such appeal the Court shall, upon motion 
of either party, • . . submit to a jury any question of fact involved in 
such case. The proceedings in every such an appeal shall be informal and 
summary, but full opportunity to be heard shall be had before judgment 
is pronounced. 
5. Abell v. Albert F. Goetze, Inc., 24S Md. 433, 226 A2d 2S3 (1967); Richardson 
v. Home Mutual Life Ins. Co., 23S Md. 2S2, 201 A2d 34-0 (1964). The trial in 
the circuit court encompasses a review of both the law and the facts. 
6. In this casenote the term circuit court includes the common law courts of Balti-
more City. 
7. 277 Md. 120, 3S3 A.2d 263 (1976). Florence D. Candella filed a claim with the 
Workmen's Compensation Commission which granted an award on April 27, 1973, 
based on a finding of permanent partial disability. The employer, insurer and 
Subsequent Injury Fund appealed to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, 
which in a trial without a jury reversed the decision of the Commission. Mrs. 
Candella appealed to the court of special appeals. The court of appeals granted 
certiorari prior to consideration by the court of special appeals and affirmed 
the decision of the circuit court. Id. at 122, 3S3 A2d at 264. 
8. Although the court of appeals does not mention the duration or extent of the 
shock, it appears that the shock was severe enough to require a fellow worker to 
disconnect the vacuum cleaner from its socket with a mop handle. Brief for 
Appellant at 3, Appendix to Appellant's Brief at E. 42. 
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" 'psychoneurosis, post-traumatic, with severe emotional disturb-
ance following electric shock' ."9 The employer and insurer pro-
duced a psychiatrist who testified that the claimant "suffered from 
'a very severe personality disorder' which was not causally related 
to the electric shock and, in fact, antedated it.''10 Based on Dr. 
Teitelbaum's opinion, the Commission awarded compensation, find-
ing that Mrs. Candella had incurred a 60 % permanent partial 
industrial disability.11 The employer, insurer and Subsequent In-
jury Fund12 appealed to the circuit court. That court, without a 
jury, heard substantially the same testimony as the Commission. 
At the end of the trial de novo, the circuit court struck Dr. Teitel-
baum's testimony because it was based solely on the medical history 
furnished by the claimant, not for the purpose of treatment but 
solely to qualify him as an expert. Without this testimony there 
was no medical evidence on which to base the findings and order 
of the Commission. Accordingly, the circuit court reversed the 
decision of the Commission.13 
On certiorari,14 the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the 
decision of the circuit court for two reasons. First, the court held 
that the opinion of a non-treating psychiatrist based on medical 
history related to him for the purpose of qualifying him as an 
expert is hearsay which does not come within any recognized ex-
9. 277 Md. at 122, 353 A.2d at 264. 
10. Id. at 122, 353 A.2d at 265. Although the psychiatrist who testified for the em-
ployer never treated the claimant, his opinion was admissible because it was 
based not only on statements from the claimant but also on notes made by a 
treating psychiatrist and on tests performed by a clinical psychologist. Appendix 
to Appellant's Brief at E. 80. 
11. Of the total 60% permanent partial industrial disability, the Commission at-
tributed 50% to the accidental injury. This became the responsibility of the 
insurer and employer. The remaining 10% was charged to the Subsequent Injury 
Fund because the Commission found that Mrs. Candella suffered from a con-
genital heart impairment. The combined effects of the previous heart condition 
and the injury resulted in a disability which was substantially greater than 
would have ensued from the accidental injury alone. 277 Md. at 122, 353 A.2d 
at 265. 
12. The Subsequent Injury Fund was established to make payments to employees 
who have a previous permanent impairment and who suffer a subsequent accident 
resulting in personal injury for which compensation is required. To qualify for 
payment from the fund the claimant must suffer an injury resulting in a perma-
nent partial or a permanent total disability which is substantially greater, by 
reason of the previous condition, than that which would have resulted from the 
subsequent injury alone. The employer and insurer pay for the portion of the 
disability attributable to the subsequent injury. The fund pays that portion of 
the award attributable to the combined effects of the subsequent injury and the 
prior disability. The Subsequent Injury Fund has the right to appeal from a 
decision of the Commission awarding payment from the fund. MD. ANN. Conx 
art. 101, § 66 (Supp. 1976). 
13. 277 Md. at 123, 353 A.2d at 265. 
14. The court of appeals granted certiorari prior to consideration of the case by the 
court of special appeals. See note 7 supra. 
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ception to the hearsay rule.15 Second, the court held that, not-
withstanding the legislative intent to liberalize the admission of 
evidence in compensation cases, Mrs. Candella's statements to the 
psychiatrist were so lacking in indicia of reliability as to deprive 
them, and consequently the psychiatrist's conclusions based thereon, 
of the probative value essential to admission.16 
Maryland follows the generally recognized rule that a physician 
consulted for treatment may testify to the medical history given 
to him by his patient.17 He may also state conclusions based on 
that history.18 This exception to the hearsay rule is permitted 
because the patient is likely to believe that the effectiveness of the 
treatment he receives will depend on the accuracy of what he tells 
the physician. The patient's belief is deemed sufficient to ensure 
the trustworthiness of his statements.19 Maryland has applied the 
same rule when the medical witness was a psychiatrist.20 
The situation is quite different, however, when the medical 
history is given to the physician solely to qualify him as an expert 
witness. Since the patient does not expect medical treatment to 
be based on his statements, the underlying rationale for the ex-
ception is absent. Indeed, since the patient is conscious of the 
pending litigation he may be motivated to falsify his symptoms 
15. 277 Md. at 123--24, 353 A.2d at 265-66. 
16. Id. at 124-26, 353 A.2d at 266-67. 
17. Fisher Body Div. v. Alston, 252 Md. 51, 249 A.2d 130 (1969) (physician who 
was visited for treatment was allowed to testify concerning history given by 
patient even though no treatment was administered); Adams v. Bensen, 208 
Md. 261, 117 A.2d 881 (1955); see Yellow Cab Co. v. Hicks, 224 Md. 563, 168 
A.2d 501 (1961). The majority of states allow a treating physician to testify to 
statements made by his patient. See, e.g., People v. Grant, 58 Ill. 2d 178, 317 
N.E.2d 564 (1974) (rule followed in criminal as well as civil cases); Arabia v. 
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 301 Mass. 397, 17 N.E.2d 202 (1938); Green-
farb v. Arre, 62 N.J. Super. 420, 163 A.2d 173 (1960); Baker v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 440 Ohio App. 539, 186 N.E. 10 (1933); Cody v. S.K.F. Indus., Inc., 
447 Pa. 558, 291 A.2d 772 (1972); Lemmon v. Denver & Rio Grande R.R., 9 
Utah 2d 195, 341 P.2d 215 (1959); C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE§ 292 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCORMICK]; 4 J. WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE § 1721, at 73 (3d ed. 1940). 
18. Adams v. Bensen, 208 Md. 261, 266--67, 117 A.2d 881, 883 (1955) ; see State v. 
Orsini, 155 Conn. 367, 232 A.2d 907 (1967); Cody v. S.K.F. Indus., Inc., 447 
Pa. 558, 291 A.2d 772 (1972); Hammond v. Industrial Comm'n, 84 Utah 67, 34 
P.2d 687 (1934); Smith v. Earst Hardware Co., 61 Wash. 2d 75, 377 P.2d 
258 (1962). 
19. 277 Md. at 123--24, 353 A.2d at 265; McCORMICK, supra note 17, at § 292. See 
Stewart v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 137 F.2d 527 (2d Cir. 1943) ; Brown v. Blauvelt, 
152 Conn. 275, 205 A.2d 773 (1964); Bober v. Independent Planting Corp., 28 
N.]. 160, 145 A.2d 463 (1958); Baker v. Industrial Comm'n, 440 Ohio App. 539, 
186 N.E. 10 (1933); Cody v. S.K.F. Indus., Inc., 447 Pa. 558, 291 A.2d 772 
(1972); Hammond v. Industrial Comm'n, 84 Utah 67, 34 P.2d 687 (1934). 
20. See Wilhelm v. State Traffic Comm'n, 230 Md. 91, 97, 185 A.2d 715, 717 (1962); 
Connor v. State, 225 Md. 543, 556-57, 171 A.2d 699, 706-07, cert. denied, 368 
U.S. 906 (1961). 
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or at least to exaggerate.21 For these reasons Maryland has not 
extended the exception to non-treating physicians.22 In Candella, 
the court of appeals recognized that some states do allow the non-
treating physician both to state medical conclusions and to relate 
the patient's history on which those conclusions are based.23 Those 
states admit the patient's history not as substantive evidence, but 
for the non-hearsay purpose of explaining the conclusion reached 
by the physician. The Candella court declined to adopt this ap-
proach and reaffirmed its prior decisions on this point.24 
Having decided that Dr. Teitelbaum's testimony did not come 
within any exception to the hearsay rule, the court next addressed 
the question of whether the testimony should have been admitted 
by the circuit court in light of the legislature's directive in Section 
11 that the Commission not be bound by the common law rules of 
evidence.25 In the past the court of appeals has recognized the 
import of this directive and in some cases has sanctioned the ad-
mission of hearsay in the trial de novo. The court has allowed 
awards to be based on hearsay, but only where the circumstances 
provided special assurance that the evidence was trustworthy.26 
The basic approach which Maryland has adopted in determining 
the admissibility of hearsay in compensation cases was first articu-
lated in Standard Oil Co. v. Mealy.27 In Mealy, the court of appeals 
upheld the circuit court's admission of statements which a deceased 
21. 277 Md. at 124, 353 A.2d at 265-66; McCoRMICK, supra note 17, at § 293. See 
Brown v. Blauvelt, 152 Conn. 275, 205 A.2d 773 (1964); Sutherland v. Kroger 
Co., 144 W. Va. 673, 110 S.E.2d 716 (1959). 
22. 277 Md. at 124, 353 A.2d at 26~6; see Riddle v. Dickens, 241 Md. 579, 217 A.2d 
304 (1966); Yellow Cab Co. v. Hicks, 224 Md. 562, 168 A.2d 501 (1961); Parker 
v. State, 189 Md. 244, 55 A.2d 784 (1947); accord, Brown v. Blauvelt, 152 Conn. 
275, 205 A.2d 773 (1964); Gotfrey v. Sakurada, 169 Neb. 879, 101 N.W.2d 470 
(1960); Baker v. Industrial Comm'n, 440 Ohio App. 539, 186 N.E. 10 (1933); 
Hammond v. Industrial Comm'n, 84 Utah 67, 34 P.2d 687 (1934). 
23. 277 Md. at 124, 353 A.2d at 266. See, e.g., Groat v. Walkup Drayage & Ware-
house Co., 14 Cal. App. 2d 350, 58 P .2d 200 (1936) ; Cronin v. Fitchburg & L. 
St. Ry., 181 Mass. 202, 63 N.E. 335 (1902); Johnson v. Bangor Ry. & Elec. 
Co., 125 Me. 88, 131 A. 1 (1925); Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 
82 Nev. 448, 420 P.2d 853 (1967); Waldroop v. Driver-Miller Plumbing & Heat-
ing Corp., 61 N.M. 412, 301 P.2d 521 (1956); Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. v. Jackson, 
63 Okla. 32, 162 P. 823 (1917); Kraetti v. North Coast Transp. Co., 166 Wash. 
186, 6 P.2d 609 (1932). 
24. 277 Md. at 124, 353 A.2d at 266. 
25. Id. 
26. See Commercial Transfer Co. v. Quasny, 245 Md. 572, 227 A.2d 20 (1967) ; 
Spence v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 173 Md. 539, 197 A. 302 (1938); Standard Oil 
Co. v. Mealy, 147 Md. 249, 127 A. 850 (1925). In other cases hearsay has also 
been held admissible, but for different reasons. See Horn Ice Cream Co. v. 
Yost, 164 Md. 24, 163 A. 823 (1933); Waddell George's Creek Coal Co. v. 
Chisholm, 163 Md. 49, 161 A. 276 (1932) ; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Traylor, 158 
Md. 116, 148 A. 246 (1930), which are more fully discussed in notes 42-46 
supra and accompanying text. 
27. 147 Md. 249, 127 A. 850 (1925). 
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workman had made to his wife and attending physicians to the 
effect that he had fallen at work and struck his side at a spot where 
a malignant growth later developed. There was no other evidence 
of accidental injury.28 The court noted that the statute which pro-
vides for appeals from the Commission to the circuit courts does 
not direct those courts to relax their established rules of evidence 
"in any degree or under any conditions."29 Yet in the court's view, 
to apply the same evidentiary rules to these appeals which are 
usually applied in the circuit courts would deprive claimants of 
the benefit of the investigative freedom granted to the Commission 
by Section 11.80 The court concluded that 
[T]he courts are required to adapt themselves somewhat 
to the increased latitude allowed to the commission, and 
that this adaptation must at the same time, and as far as 
it can consistently be done, avoid abandonment of cautions 
and safeguards which seem necessary, not only for consti-
tutional due process of law, but also for the assurance of 
reliability in the basis of adjudication. We conclude that 
the courts are not intended to withdraw from litigants 
under the act all the precautions which in the course of 
time have been worked out as essentials of orderly, certain 
justice. And whatever foundation there may be for ob-
jections to the rule excluding hearsay in its full extent, 
it must be admitted that there is still a large residuum of 
necessary precaution embodied in it.81 
The court declined to fix any absolute standard for the admissi-
bility of hearsay in compensation cases, but decided that the state-
ments of the deceased worker were admissible. The statements 
were repeated by three or four witnesses, referred to a simple fact 
and left no room for substantial misunderstanding. These circum-
28. Id. at 252-53, 127 A. at 851. 
29. Id. at 254, 127 A. at 851. In the court's view, the allowance of an appeal must 
intend a review of the Commission decisions with some advantage from the 
special training of the circuit court judges. It is interesting to note that, at the 
time Mealy was decided, Commissioners were not required to be lawyers. The 
requirement that they "be selected from those who have been admitted to the 
practice of law in this State" was added in Law of April 10, 1957, ch. 584, § 1 (c}, 
[1957] Laws of Md. 969 (current version at Mn. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 1 (c) 
(1964) ). Now that Commissioners have legal training, they should be better able 
to use safely the broad discretion given to them by the legislature. Their de-
cisions seemingly should require less oversight by circuit court judges on ques-
tions of law. 
30. Standard Oil Co. v. Mealy, 147 Md. at 254, 127 A. at 851-52. Here the court 
of appeals impliedly recognized the futility of allowing evidence, which would 
not meet common law competency standards, to support a finding before the 
Commission if the same evidence is to be excluded on review de novo. Such a 
double standard would ensure that the party who successfully relies on such 
evidence at the commission hearing would face reversal on review de novo. Thus, 
any benefit provided to a claimant by Section 11 would be lost. 
31. Id. at 254, 127 A. at 852. 
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stances, the court concluded, provided adequate assurance of relia-
bility even though the statements were hearsay.32 
Mealy was decided in 1925, eleven years after the creation of 
the Workmen's Compensation Commission. Since then the court 
of appeals has expressly avoided issuing a binding rule for the 
admissibility of hearsay in compensation cases. Instead, it has 
directed that each case be decided on its particular facts. 33 A 
review of the pertinent cases reveals that the court has been very 
reluctant to extend the admission of hearsay much beyond the 
limits defined by the circumstances in Mealy. 
In Spence v. Bethlehem Steel Co.,34 the workman died of pneu-
monia. The only evidence that the disease was caused by an acci-
dental injury consisted of statements by the workman, testified to 
by his wife and his doctor, that he had been exposed to poisonous 
gas while working in burning tar. The wife also testified to the 
physical appearance of her husband when he returned from work 
the day of the incident.35 In addition to repeating the deceased's 
statement, the doctor testified that lobar pneumonia could be in-
duced by exposure to gas.36 The court of appeals upheld the ad-
missibility of the statements,37 and at the same time declared, 
"[t]his court has not said ... that the safeguards against the 
admission generally of hearsay evidence in compensation cases 
should be disregarded, but that [hearsay] should be received with 
great caution . ... "38 Here as in Mealy, the court found the de-
ceased's statements were sufficiently reliable to permit their ad-
mission. The statements were made by a workman whose subse-
quent death had prevented his testimony, were closely related to 
the physical condition of the workman and were made promptly 
after the injury.39 
The most recent case to rule on the admissibility of hearsay in 
a compensation case was Commercial Transfer Co. v. Quasny.40 In 
Quasny, the workman suffered a fatal heart attack when a barrel 
he was loading onto a truck slipped. Unusual exertion was required 
to return the barrel to its upright position. The hearsay was 
32. Id. at 255, 127 A. at 852. 
33. Commercial Transfer Co. v. Quasny, 245 Md. 572, 580, 227 A.2d 20, 24 (1967). 
34. 173 Md. 539, 197 A. 302 (1938). 
35. Id. at 543-44, 197 A. at 304. 
36. Id. at 544-45, 197 A. at 304-05. 
37. The Commission originally denied a claim by the workman's widow. Her appeal 
to the circuit level court was heard on the record made before the Commission. 
The circuit court also denied the widow's claim and instructed a verdict for the 
employer. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for trial. Id. 
at 553, 197 A. at 308. 
38. Id. at 549, 197 A. at 307 (emphasis added). 
39. Id. at 55(}-52, 197 A. at 307-08. 
40. 245 Md. 572, 227 A.2d 20 (1967). 
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similar to that in Mealy and in Spence. The testimony of Quasny's 
widow consisted of her husband's statements to her about how the 
accident had occurred. Both the Commission and the circuit court 
admitted her testimony and awarded compensation. In affirming, 
the court of appeals noted that Quasny was hospitalized immedi-
ately after the accident, received last rites from a priest, and was 
physically unable to make statements until he spoke to his wife 
about six hours after the accident. In this totality of circumstances, 
the court found sufficient indicia of reliability to admit Quasny's 
hearsay statement.41 
In other cases, the court of appeals has sanctioned the admis-
sion of hearsay when it was merely cumulative. In Horn Ice Cream 
Co. v. Yost,42 the worker was knocked down when an ice cream 
tub fell against him. He died sometime later. The mother of the 
deceased worker testified that he said he had suffered a blow to 
the head.43 In affirming an award of compensation, the court of 
appeals noted that the testimony of three eyewitnesses to the 
accident permitted the inference that the tub had struck the 
workman on the head. In light of the eyewitness testimony, the 
court reasoned that it was not apparent how the admission of the 
mother's hearsay testimony prejudiced the insurer.44 Similarly, in 
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Traylor45 and in Waddell George's Creek 
Coal Co. v. Chisholm,46 the circuit courts admitted hearsay state-
41. Id. at 580, Z27 A.2d at 24. 
42. 164 Md. 24, 163 A. 823 (1933). 
43. Id. at 26, 163 A. at 824. The review de novo was based on the record produced 
at the Commission hearing. The circuit court admitted the hearsay testimony of 
Yost's mother and affirmed the award of the Commission. 
44. Id. at 30, 163 A. at 825. 
45. 158 Md. 116, 148 A. 246 (1930). In Traylor, the issue was whether the pneu-
monia which caused the workman's death resulted from accidental exposure to 
gas on the job or from natural causes. The circuit court permitted the wife to 
testify that on several occasions when her husband returned from work he 
appeared very ill and complained that he had been gassed. Other workers testified 
to seeing the deceased on the occasions in question working in an engine pit full 
of gas. The court of appeals said that the statements from the deceased were 
merely cumulative when considered with other direct evidence tending to sustain 
the theory that death resulted from the exposure. The court found that the con-
siderations which influenced the admission of hearsay in Mealy were weightier 
than those present in the facts of Traylor. Nevertheless, the court concluded that 
it would frustrate the remedial purpose of the Workmen's Compensation statute 
to hold that the admission of Traylor's statement was reversible error. Id. at 
124, 148 A. at 249. 
46. 163 Md. 49, 161 A. 276 (1936). In Chisholm, the workman died as a result of 
an operation necessitated by a hernia. At issue was whether the hernia resulted 
from an accident in the mine where the workman was employed. The workman's 
wife and co-workers testified before the Commission that the deceased told them 
he sustained the hernia when he accidentally slipped while moving a rock. The 
testimony on the record from the Commission hearing was admitted before the 
circuit court which granted an award. In affirming, the court of appeals found 
no reason to exclude the hearsay because, in addition to the hearsay, other testi-
mony supported the conclusion of accidental injury. 
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ments made by workmen who subsequently died. The statements 
were each made to a relative concerning a simple fact of how the 
injury was incurred and therefore the statements closely fit the 
factual pattern of Mealy. The court of appeals allowed the hearsay 
to stand largely because there was other testimony to the same 
effect as the hearsay. Thus the court did little more than find that 
any error committed was harmless and that the Commission and 
the trier of facts on appeal could have made the same inference 
of accidental injury even without the challenged statements. In 
this sense, Yost, Traylor and Chisholm do not represent a digres-
sion from the common law rules of evidence. 
When the court of appeals has not found sufficient assurance 
of reliability, it has approved the exclusion of hearsay evidence in 
compensation cases at the trial de novo. In Bethlehem Steel Co. v. 
Ziegenfuss,47 the claimant sought compensation for a hernia al-
legedly caused by an accidental injury on the job. One of the 
prerequisites for compensation for a hernia is proof that the hernia 
did not exist prior to the injury.48 To meet this requirement the 
claimant offered her own testimony as to what the employer's 
physician had told her during a medical examination eight months 
prior to the alleged injury.49 In holding this testimony inadmissible 
before the circuit court, the court of appeals ruled that despite 
the relaxation of the ordinary rules of evidence in compensation 
cases, a person with no medical education could not meet the 
requirement of definite proof by testifying to a medical opinion 
given to her by a doctor. The court reasoned that the admission of 
this testimony would carry the relaxation of the rules too far.50 
In Standard Gas Equipment Co. v. Baldwin,51 the court of appeals 
held it was error to allow the reading of the official death certificate 
of the deceased workman at the trial in the circuit court. The 
information concerning the cause of death on the certificate was 
provided by the widow who did not see her husband alive after 
his alleged injury. She could not have gotten the information from 
her husband and she was not present at the accident herself. The 
court decided this hearsay lacked the indicia of reliability which 
had persuaded the court to admit hearsay in other cases.112 
47. 187 Md. 283, 49 A.2d 793 (1946). 
48. Id. at 288-89, 49 A.2d at 795; Mn. ANN. CoDE art. 101, § 36(5) (1964). 
49. The commission denied compensation on the grounds that the claimant failed to 
show she had no pre-existing hernia. The circuit court, with a jury, decided the 
issue in her favor and reversed the order of the Commission. The court of 
appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court and affirmed the order of 
the Commission. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Ziegenfuss, 187 Md. at 285, 49 A.2d 
at 794. 
50. Id. at 294-95, 49 A.2d at 798-99. 
51. 152 Md. 321, 136 A. 644 (1927). 
52. Id. at 326-27, 136 A. at 646. 
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These compensation cases in which hearsay testimony was 
offered at the circuit court trial indicate that such evidence may 
be admissible, but only if the circumstances provide special as-
surance that the testimony is trustworthy. The court of appeals, 
in Candella, found that the testimony of Dr. Teitelbaum lacked 
this assurance.53 In reaching this conclusion the court emphasized 
certain facts. The psychiatrist's opinion was based entirely on 
statements made by Mrs. Candella.54 She had been referred to 
him by her attorney to assist in preparing her case. She realized 
she would not be treated by the psychiatrist and related her history 
solely to qualify him as an expert.55 The court found a great 
distinction between the reliability of the statements made by Mrs. 
Candella and the reliability of the hearsay statements held ad-
missible in prior compensation cases. In those prior cases the 
statements related to simple facts which left " 'no room for sub-
stantial misunderstanding,' "56 while the subject matter of Dr. 
Teitelbaum's opinion involved a complex area of medical science. 
Therefore, the court found that "the statements on which the 
[psychiatrist's] conclusions were based cannot withstand the close 
scrutiny of hearsay testimony mandated by our prior decisions."57 
In scrutinizing the testimony of Dr. Teitelbaum, the court 
emphasized the unreliability of statements made to a non-treating 
psychiatrist. Alternatively the court might have analyzed more 
closely the nature of psychiatry and found a similarity between 
statements to a non-treating psychiatrist and the physical ex-
amination by a non-treating physician. Even in jurisdictions like 
Maryland where a non-treating physician is not permitted to give 
an opinion based on statements from the patient,58 he is permitted 
to give an opinion based on his personal observations and measure-
ments of the patient's physical condition.59 His opinion is ad-
missible because his special training qualifies him to interpret these 
physical conditions60 and because it is not based on any statements. 
53. 277 Md. at 126, 353 A.2d at 267. 
54. Id. at 122, 353 A.2d at 264. 
55. Id. at 126, 353 A.2d at 267. 
56. Id. Here the court quoted from the leading case, Standard Oil Co. v. Mealy, 
147 Md. 249, 255, 127 A. 850, 852 (1925). 
57. 277 Md. at 126, 353 A2d at 267. 
58. See note 22 supra. 
59. In Adams v. Bensen, 208 Md. 261, 117 A.2d 881 (1955), the court ruled that it 
would have been error to allow the non-treating physician to give an opinion 
based on the history recited by the patient, but it was not error for him to testify 
that the patient winced and was in obvious discomfort when the physician flexed 
the patient's wrist. In Francies v. Deba11gh, 194 Md. 448, 457, 71 A.2d 455, 
458-59 (1950), the court permitted a non-treating physician to give an opinion 
based on observation of both the patient and x-rays of the patient's chest, but the 
court would not allow an opinion based on statements from the patient himself. 
60. See Langenfelder v. Thompson, 179 Md. 502, 505-06, 20 A.2d 491, 493 (1941). 
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The nature of psychiatry, however, is different from other areas of 
medical science. This fact was at least indirectly recognized by 
the court in Candella.61 In diagnosing diseases or conditions of 
the mind, the psychiatrist relies largely on the patient's statements 
to formulate his opinion.62 Thus, statements to a psychiatrist are 
analogous to physical observations by a physician. Because a 
psychiatrist is trained to analyze not only what the patient says 
but how he says it,63 he is specially qualified to evaluate the credi-
bility of the patient's statements. The Commissioners and judges 
should be allowed to rely on the psychiatrist's ability to analyze 
these subjective factors in the formulation of the psychiatric 
opinion just as they are allowed to rely on the expertise of the 
physician to analyze physical symptoms.64 
Of course, statements to a non-treating psychiatrist are still 
hearsay according to the common law rule, 65 but it has been 
61. Concerning the nature of a psychiatric examination, the court said: 
As one might expect in the case of a psychiatrist, his examination con-
sisted solely of hearing the subjective statements furnished by the claimant, 
and his conclusions were based exclusively on that informatioIL 
277 Md. at 126, 353 A.2d at 267. 
62. Unlike other medical examinations done with the aid of instruments, blood 
tests, x-rays, and other modalities, the mental status examination is basic-
ally a verbal relationship between patient and psychiatrist. 
R. COHEN, TRAUMATIC NEUROSIS IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES 40 (1970). 
The end result of this verbal relationship is the formulation of the psychiatric 
opinion. One writer describes the process as follows: 
Through relatively indirect questions, the psychiatrist seeks to gain a 
comprehensive picture of the background of the patient, the personality 
characteristics of the principal members of the family, the nature of the 
social environment and, most important of all, the emotional attitudes and 
adaptive techniques of the patient 
A. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FoR LAWYERS 306 (1968). 
63. [T]he matter of factual accuracy is relatively unimportant, since the point 
of real diagnostic significance is how the patient views and evaluates his 
experiences. We do not expect the "facts" which are presented to be his-
torically accurate. However, they are the most accurate presentation of 
the patient's attitudes about these facts. Since these are the forces which 
motivate his behavior, they must be regarded as the crucial data. During 
the course of the interview, the psychiatrist "listens with his third ear"; 
in other words, he listens for the spoken and unspoken clues to deeper 
emotional attitudes which the patient holds unbeknownst to himself. 
A. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FoR LAWYERS 306 (1968) (emphasis in original; 
footnotes omitted). 
64. The law recognizes the psychiatrist as an expert, but the rule excluding the 
opinion of a non-treating psychiatrist fails to take into account the ability of the 
psychiatrist to analyze not only what the patient says but how he says it. The 
rule mistakenly presupposes that the non-treating psychiatrist is unaware of the 
patient's motive to falsify and that he accepts the patient's statements at face 
value. Moreover, the danger in permitting a non-treating psychiatrist to give an 
opinion based on possibly falsified statements is not significantly greater than 
the danger in permitting a non-treating physician to give an opinion based on 
falsified physical symptoms. 
65. See Wilhelm v. State Traffic Comm'n, 230 Md. 91, 185 A.2d 715 (1962); Connor 
v. State, 225 Md. 543, 171 A.2d 699, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 906 (1961). 
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established that the mere fact that testimony is hearsay does not 
exclude it from compensation cases. 66 Moreover, a minority of 
states sees no reason to exclude the opinion of a non-treating phy-
sician based on the patient's history.67 By adopting this less re-
strictive approach, at least for compensation cases, the court of 
appeals could have found sufficient assurance that Dr. Teitelbaum's 
opinion was reliable. At the same time, the court would have 
struck a more even balance between the latitude contemplated by 
Section 11 and the need for adequate safeguards in the admission 
of evidence in compensation cases. 
Aside from its particular evidentiary conclusion, the court in 
Candella again left unresolved the question of when hearsay 
testimony is admissible in compensation cases. After analyzing 
the pertinent cases, one is tempted to conclude that the only hearsay 
statements that will be admissible are those of a deceased employee 
describing a simple fact of how he was injured. But the court has 
repeatedly denied such a narrow interpretation.68 It continues to 
reject the adoption of a binding rule to govern hearsay in these 
cases.69 Instead, the court has proposed that previous cases be 
followed and that each future case be decided on its particular 
facts.70 
The court's attempt to balance the informality and liberality 
desirable in Workmen's Compensation cases71 with the precautions 
that have come to be essential in any system of orderly justice72 
has produced several recognizable, though vague, guidelines. Gen-
erally, the Commissioners are not required to follow closely the 
rules of evidence.73 But there must be limits to the discretion 
allowed to the Commissioners in admitting and excluding evidence 
in order to achieve a necessary degree of certainty in the admin-
istration of the Workmen's Compensation Article.74 The circuit 
courts in reviewing compensation cases are required to modify 
their own criteria for the admission of evidence in light of the 
66. See notes 27-41 supra and accompanying text. 
67. See note 23 supra and accompanying text. 
68. See Commercial Transfer Co. v. Quasny, 245 Md. 572, 580, 227A2d 20, 24 (1967). 
69. 277 Md. at 126, 353 A.2d at 266; Commercial Transfer Co. v. Quasny, 245 Md. 
572, 580, 227 A.2d 20, 24 (1967) ; see Spence v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 173 Md. 539, 
197 A. 302 (1938); Horn Ice Cream Co. v. Yost, 164 Md. 24, 163 A. 823 (1933); 
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Traylor, 158 Md. 116, 148 A. 246 (1930); Standard Oil 
Co. v. Mealy, 147 Md. 249, 127 A. 850 (1925). 
70. 277 Md. at 126, 353 A.2d at 266; Commercial Transfer Co. v. Quasny, 245 Md. 
572, 580, 227 A.2d 20, 24 (1967); see Spence v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 173 Md. 539, 
71. See Horn Ice Cream Co. v. Yost, 164 Md. 24, 31, 163 A. 823, 826 (1933). 
72. See Standard Oil Co. v. Mealy, 147 Md. 249, 127 A. 850 (1925). 
73. Commercial Transfer Co. v. Quasny, 245 Md. 572, 227 A.2d 20 (1967) ; Standard 
Oil Co. v. Mealey, 147 Md. 249, 254, 127 A. 850, 851-52 (1927). 
74. Horn Ice Cream Co. v. Yost, 164 Md. 24, 31, 163 A. 823, 826 (1933). 
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latitude allowed to the Commission.75 More specifically, hearsay 
testimony will not be barred merely because it is hearsay,76 but 
such evidence is only to be admitted with "great caution."77 There 
must be circumstances in the case which provide assurance that 
the evidence is worthy of belief.78 In adopting this approach the 
court reasons that caution is necessary to satisfy the requirements 
of constitutional due process of law and to ensure the reliability 
of the grounds on which compensation decisions are based.79 
Maryland is not alone in approaching the admission of hearsay 
in compensation cases with caution. This fact becomes evident 
when one considers the manner in which other jurisdictions have 
treated hearsay testimony in compensation cases.80 A distinct 
minority of states retains the common law rules of evidence in 
compensation cases and treats the admission of hearsay as re-
versible error.81 A majority of states employs a less restrictive, 
though not entirely satisfactory, approach known as the "residuum 
rule."82 First propounded by the New York Court of Appeals in 
75. Standard Oil Co. v. Mealy, 147 Md. 249, 254, 127 A. 850, 852 (1927). 
76. See 277 Md. 120, 353 A.2d 263; Commercial Transfer Co. v. Quasny, 245 Md. 
572, 227 A.2d 20 (1967); Spence v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 173 Md. 539, 197 A. 
302 (1938); Standard Oil Co. v. Mealy, 147 Md. 249, 127 A. 850 (1927). 
77. Spence v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 173 Md. 539, 549, 197 A. 302, 307 (1938). 
78. Id. at 549-50, 197 A.2d at 307; Standard Gas Equip. Co. v. Baldwin, 152 
Md. 321, 326, 136 A. 644, 646 (1927). 
79. Standard Oil Co. v. Mealey, 147 Md. 252, 254, 127 A. 850, 852 (1927). 
80. A thorough treatment of the use of hearsay in compensation cases in the various 
states is beyond the scope of this note. The discussion of other jurisdictions in 
the text is intended to show Maryland's relative position on this question. It 
should be noted that in developing its position the Maryland court acted inde-
pendently without reliance on the case law of any other state. For a full dis-
cussion of the treatment of hearsay in compensation cases see 3 A. LARSON, 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §§ 79.00-79.42 (1952) [hereinafter cited as 
LARSON]; Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 12, §§ 25-29 (1971); for earlier cases see Note, 
The Common Law Rules and Rules Governing the Reception of Evidence by 
Workmen's Compensation Commissions, 24 low A L. REv. 576 (1939); Ross, 
The Applicability of Common Law Rules of Evidence in Proceedings before 
Workmen's Compensation Commissions, 36 HARv. L. REV. 263 (1923). 
81. Larson notes that this approach is now largely limited to states with court 
administered compensation systems. LARSON, supra note 80, at § 79.22. See 
Truck Ins. Exch. v. Michling, 364 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. 1963); Liljeblom v. Dept. 
of Labor & Indus., 57 Wash. 2d 136, 356 P.2d 307 (1960). 
82. Larson reports that the majority of states follow the residuum rule in compen-
sation cases. LARSON, supra note 80, at § 79.22. But see 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 14.12, at 313 (1958); Davis, The Residuum Rule iii 
Administrative Law, 28 RocKY MT. L. REv. 1, 22 (1972). In these works on 
general administrative law, Davis warns that it is not clear that the residuum 
rule actually prevails in most states. Many courts pay lip service to the rule but 
employ subtle and well concealed methods to avoid the effect of the rule. Thus 
those courts often reach the same results as the courts which expressly reject 
the rule. For further analysis of the residuum rule, see Note, The Residuum 
Rule and Appellate Fact Review: Marriage of Necessity, 13 RUTGERS L. REv. 
254 (1959). 
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Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co.,ss the residuum rule allows the 
admission of hearsay but requires that an award not be supported 
by hearsay alone. According to the rule, there must be in addition 
to the hearsay, a residuum of legally competent evidence on which 
to base the award.s4 While the residuum rule has been widely 
accepted,s5 it has also been criticized.s6 This criticism stems mainly 
from the fact that the states which have adopted it also have 
statutes which direct that their commissioners not be bound by 
the common law or technical rules of evidence.s7 The dissenting 
judge in Carroll recognized this apparent contradiction between 
statute and judicial interpretation, when he questioned whether 
it was reasonable to believe that the legislature intended to allow 
the commissioners to admit hearsay evidence but at the same time 
to prohibit them from making any legal use of it.ss Remaining are 
83. 218 N.Y. 435, 113 N.E. 507 (1916). 
84. Id. at 440, 113 N.E. at 509. In Carroll, the workman's dependents claimed com-
pensation for his death, and offered in evidence statements of the deceased that 
he had been struck by a block of ice. Eyewitnesses denied that such an injury 
had been received. The court ruled that while the commission is not limited by 
the common law rules of evidence and it may in its discretion accept any evi-
dence that is offered, still there must be a residuum of legal evidence to support 
the claim before an award can be made. The impact of the residuum rule was 
lessened somewhat in Altschuller v. Bressler, 289 N.Y. 463, 46 N.E.2d 886 
(1943), which upheld a compensation award based on hearsay statements of an 
employee. The New York Court of Appeals concluded that the established 
circumstances in the case left little doubt that the statements were substantially 
true. In Altschuller, the court stated that the necessary residuum can be found 
in corroborating circumstances which enhance the reliability of the hearsay. 
Thus the gap between the residuum rule and the approach taken by Maryland 
may not be as great as it first appears. See LARSON, supra note 80, at § 7924. 
Nonetheless the Carroll case has not been overruled by the New York Court 
of Appeals and later cases show that the residuum rule is still in force. See, e.g., 
Comstock v. Goetz Oil Corp., 286 App. Div. 132, 142 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1955). 
85. See, e.g., Johnson v. Industrial Comm'n, 137 Colo. 591, 328 P.Zd 384 (1958); 
Zawisza v. Quality Name Plate, Inc., 149 Conn. 115, 176 A2d 578 (1961); 
Valentine v. Weaver, 191 Ky. 37, 228 S.W. 1036 (1921); Hackford v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 11 Utah 2d 312, 358 P 2d 899 (1961) ; Ramey v. State Compensa-
tion Comm'r, 150 W. Va. 402, 146 S.E.2d 579 (1966). Pennsylvania has in-
corporated the concept of the residuum rule into its Workmen's Compensation 
Statute, providing that the board shall not ''be bound by the common law or 
statutory rules of evidence ... but all findings of fact shall be based upon suffi-
cient competent evidence to justify same." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 834 (Purdon 
Supp. 1976-77). 
86. Wigmore notes that the residuum rule assumes that all legally admissible evi-
dence is reliable and that all other evidence is unreliable. Common experience 
belies both assumptions. Deceptive evidence often gets into trials conducted 
under strict evidence rules, while some evidence, upon which a prudent person 
would base decisions in his private affairs, is barred. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 
§ 4(b), at 41-42 (3d ed. 1940). 
87. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.135 (1962); Aruz. REv. STAT. § 23-941 (Supp. 
1976-77); CoNN. GEN. STAT.§ 31-298 (West 1958); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 34:15-56 
(West 1959); N.Y. WoRK. CoMP. LAW § 118 (McKinney 1965); UTAH ConE 
ANN. § 35-1-88 (1953); W. VA. CODE § 23-1-15 (1973). 
88. Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 446, 113 N.E. 507, 511 (1916) 
(Seabury, J., dissenting). 
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those states which admit hearsay and impliedly or specifically reject 
the residuum rule. These states take the least restrictive view of 
the use of hearsay in compensation cases. In their view, hearsay 
evidence is not only admissible, but under certain circumstances 
an award can be supported by hearsay alone.89 
Although Maryland adheres to the least restrictive of these 
three approaches,90 the method used by the court of appeals to set 
a standard for the admissibility of hearsay can be criticized on the 
grounds that the guidelines are so general that they provide little 
real direction to the Commissioners, judges or parties. The court 
of appeals attempted to answer this criticism in Horn Ice Cream 
Co. v. Yost. 91 The court conceded that the problem of reconciling 
the latitude allowed to the Commission by Section 11 with the 
necessity for reliability in the admission of evidence has not been 
satisfactorily solved.92 The court questioned, however, whether the 
problem is susceptible to final resolution.93 The court said that 
while it could set the outer limits of the discretion given to the 
Commission, it would be difficult to define those limits with any 
greater precision.94 
89. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has ruled that hearsay statements are 
properly admissible in evidence before the Commission and the Commission has 
the discretion to give weight to the hearsay statements in arriving at its finding 
of facts. Williams v. Fuqua, 199 Va. 709, 101 S.E.2d 562 (1958). The Virginia 
court had previously decided that hearsay evidence is admissible under the Work-
men's Compensation Act and could be used as the basis of an award. Derby v. 
Swift & Co., 188 Va. 336, 49 S.E2d 417 (1948). In American Furniture Co. v. 
Graves, 141 Va. 1, 126 S.E. 213 (1925), the court noted that other courts with 
·similar statutes had held that, although hearsay evidence is admissible, an award 
can be set aside if other non-hearsay evidence is not sufficient to support the 
award. The Virginia court rejected this approach, stating that such an inter-
pretation would make the statutory provision allowing hearsay a senseless and 
useless thing. 
The California Workmen's Compensation Act provides that "[n]o order, 
decision, award, or rule shall be invalidated because of the admission into the 
record, and use as proof of any fact in dispute, of any evidence not admissible 
under the common law or statutory rules of evidence and procedure." CAL. LAB. 
ConE § 5709 (West 1971). This provision appears to be designed specifically to 
negate the residuum rule. 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 14.12, 
at 319 (1958). California has adopted a rule that hearsay standing alone may 
support an award if the Commission finds that the evidence carries sufficient 
convincing force. See, e.g., Sada v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 11 Cal. 2d 363, 
78 P.2d 1127 (1938) ; Hendricks v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 25 Cal. App. 
2d 534, 78 P.2d 189 (1938); State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acci-
dent Comm'n, 195 Cal. 174, 231 P. 996 (1924). 
90. The Maryland Court of Appeals has impliedly rejected the residuum rule by 
upholding awards of compensation even when the only evidence of an accidental, 
work-related injury was hearsay. See notes 27-41 supra and accompanying text. 
91. 164 Md. 24, 163 A. 823 (1933). 
92. Id. at 31-32, 163 A. at 826. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
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In Candella, the court of appeals neither added new guidelines 
nor clarified the existing ones. The case simply provides yet 
another example of a type of hearsay which will not be permitted 
in compensation cases - the opinion of a non-treating physician 
or psychiatrist based solely on the history recited by the patient. 
The result is that in future compensation cases when hearsay evi-
dence arises under any different set of facts, the guidelines are 
as unclear as ever. 
Perhaps more disturbing is whether the court of appeals in 
Candella and in previous cases has adequately carried out the 
intent of the legislature embodied in Section 11 that the Commis-
sion not be bound by the common law rules of evidence. The court 
has recognized the import of that section in holding that the mere 
fact that testimony is hearsay will not bar its admission.95 But 
the court has subjected this type of evidence to such close scrutiny 
that the hearsay rule is substantially intact in compensation cases. 
In light of the court's own admonition that the statute is social 
legislation and should be liberally construed to achieve its general 
purpose,96 a less stringent standard is preferable. Despite as-
sertions to the contrary, one might even argue that the court has 
done little more than carve out a new exception to the hearsay 
rule, that exception being statements of deceased workmen con-
cerning a simple fact related to the accidental injury in a compen-
sation case. Admittedly, under these circumstances a strict ad-
herence to the hearsay rule would have a devastating effect on the 
claim of a deceased workman's dependents. Thus, the court's prior 
decisions have at least partially reduced the harsh effect of the 
hearsay rule in compensation cases. But, as Candella demonstrates, 
there is still a wide gap between the bold directive in the statute 
and the close scrutiny which has been applied by the court. 
Kevin F. O'Neill 
95. See notes 27-46 suPra and accompanying text. 
96. See note 4 suP,.a and accompanying text. 
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